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SUPREME COURT
STATE OF WASHINGTON
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No. 39141-8-III

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent

v.

MARC MACIAS, Petitioner

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF KLICKITAT COUNTY

THE HONORABLE JUDGE RANDALL C. KROG

PETITION FOR REVIEW

Marie J. Trombley, WSBA 41410
PO Box 829
Graham, WA
253-445-7920

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questioning applies psychological pressure. June
13, 2019. [www.
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I. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

Petitioner Marc Macias, the appellant below, asks the Court to review the decision of Division III of the Court of Appeals referred to in Section II below.

II. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Marc Macias seeks review and reversal of the Court of Appeals unpublished opinion entered April 16, 2024. A copy of the opinion is attached as an appendix.

III. ISSUES ON REVIEW

A. Whether admission of Mr. Macias' statements violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Based on a report of events that were alleged to have occurred in December 2021, a Klickitat County deputy reviewed text messages between Mr. Macias and another individual. RP 58, 60-61. Based on the review and discussion with the reporting party, the deputy applied for and received authorization to intercept and record a pretext phone call. RP 86,88. After hearing the pretext call conversation, the deputy determined to meet Macias. RP 89.

CrR 3.5 testimony

The deputy testified he went to Mr. Macias's workplace. The deputy believed he had already established probable cause to arrest before meeting with Macias. He testified, "But I wanted to give him

an opportunity to tell me whatever he had to in terms of the investigation.” RP 7.

He testified, “Pretty much I asked him about the night of the incident, asked him what he could tell me about it.” RP 8-9. And “Once he began to make criminalizing statements. He started to admit a little bit of the vague comments I was making” the deputy then provided Macias with Miranda warnings. RP 9.

After the warnings, Macias made more incriminating statements and was arrested. The deputy provided Miranda warnings a second time after he handcuffed Macias, and at the jail, the deputy provided another set of warnings before he

asked more detailed questions about the alleged incident. RP 13.

The court made four findings on the record but did not enter written findings and conclusions of law. RP 18-23.

The court found the initial contact at the workplace was an interrogation, but because Macias was not restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest and not forced to speak with the deputy, the interrogation was not custodial. The court concluded Miranda warnings were unnecessary at the initial interrogation. RP 21.

The court found that after Macias made incriminating statements while still at the worksite, the deputy provided Miranda warnings. RP 21. The

court found that prior to the warnings, Macias had been not restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest: “In the event that he was determined to be in custody at that time, the court makes a finding he was not in custody at that time.” RP 21. The court concluded Mr. Macias knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to an attorney and to remain silent. RP 21.

The third finding: after Macias made additional incriminating statements, the officer determined it was appropriate to place him under arrest and had him escorted off the property. At that time, he was essentially restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest and handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car. He was restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest. He was actually under arrest at that time. And again, he was Mirandized from the car. So, he was in custody.

RP 22-23.

The court concluded that statements made in the patrol car were made voluntarily. RP 23.

The Court found that after Mr. Macias had been transported to the jail, he was advised a third time of his Miranda rights, and concluded Macias agreed to waive those rights and make statements to the Deputy. RP 22-23.

The court held all four sets of statements were admissible as Macias had made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to not incriminate himself. RP 22-23.

The matter proceeded to a bench trial. The court found Macias guilty. CP 35. Macias made a timely appeal, arguing in pertinent part that he had

been subjected to a two-step interrogation and his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to admission of the statements. CP 57-82.

In its opinion, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's conclusion that Macias was not in custody when he was confronted by the officer at his workplace, and there was therefore not a two-step interrogation. *Slip Op.* p. 8 (appendix).

IV. WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED

Article I, §9 of the Washington Constitution provides that “no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself. The State protection against self-incrimination is co-extensive with the protection afforded by the Fifth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.¹ *State v. Unga*,
165 Wn.2d 95, 100, 196 P.3d 645 (2008).

This Court should accept review under RAP
13.4(b)(3) because untimely *Miranda* warnings
present a significant question of both State and
Federal constitutional law.

Where law enforcement officers do not advise
an individual of his constitutional right to remain
silent before beginning a custodial interrogation
seeking incriminating information, a constitutional
violation has occurred. *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S.
436, 444, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966);

¹ No person...shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V.

State v. Hickman, 157 Wn.App. 767-772, 238 P.3d 1240 (2010).

The *Miranda* warnings are a “critical safeguard of the right to cut off questioning” allows the individual “to control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation. The requirement that law enforcement authorities must respect a person’s exercise of that option counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting.” *Michigan v. Mosely*, 423 U.S. 96, 103-104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); *State v. Lorenz*, 152 Wn.2d 22, 36, 93 P.3d 133 (2004).

Macias Was In Police Custody At His Workplace

Review of the trial court's determination of whether a suspect was in custody for purposes of *Miranda* warnings is reviewed de novo. *State v. Rosas-Miranda*, 176 Wn.App. 773, 779, 309 P.3d 728 (2013).

The objective test for assessing custody is whether "a reasonable person in a suspect's position would have felt that his or her freedom was curtailed to the degree associated with a formal arrest: they are in custody." *State v. Heritage*, 152 Wn.2d 210, 218, 95 P.3d 345 (2004); *State v. Short*, 113 Wn.2d 35, 40, 775 P.2d 458 (1988). Additionally, when an individual's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest'; or he is otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any

significant way, he is in custody, triggering the need to provide *Miranda* warnings. *California v. Beheler*,⁴⁶³ U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983); *Berkmer v. McCarty*,⁴⁶⁸ U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). Absent *Miranda* warnings, a suspect's incriminating statements during a custodial interrogation are presumed involuntary. *State v. Heritage*, 152 Wn.2d at 214.

Where law enforcement deliberately elicits incriminating information without a warning, and subsequently provides *Miranda* warnings without a significant break in time or place and without informing a suspect that his earlier statements cannot be used against him, neither the pre-*Miranda*

statements nor the post-*Miranda* statements should be admitted at trial. *Hickman*, 157 Wn.App. 767.

The issue in this matter is two-fold: (1) whether Macias was in custody when the initial questioning occurred; and (2) whether Macias was subject to deliberate questioning intended to obtain incriminating answers without *Miranda* warnings.

Macias Was in Custody.

Custody is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought to present a serious danger of coercion. *State v. Escalante*, 195 Wn.2d 526, 533, 461 P.3d 1183 (2020)(internal citation omitted). The relevant question is how a reasonable person in Macias's position would have understood

his situation. *Thompson v. Keohane*, 516 U.S. 99. 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995).

A Court considers the totality of circumstances including the duration and character of the questioning to determine whether an individual felt his freedom was curtailed. *State v. Escalante*, 195 Wn.2d at 534.

The totality of the circumstances considered by the Court include (1) the number of officers and whether they were armed, (2) whether the individual was restrained either by physical force or threats, (3) whether the individual was isolated from others; (4) whether the individual was informed he was free to leave or terminate the interview. *State v. Rosas-Miranda*, 176 Wn.App. at 783.

In this instance, the deputy arrived unannounced at Macias's workplace. He was on duty, and it can be assumed carried a loaded service weapon.

The officer asked Macias's coworkers to find Macias and bring Macias to him. When Macias was isolated, he asked him about the incident. Macias was never told he was free to leave.

The authority and domination of even a single armed officer, arriving to one's workplace, isolating the individual and subjecting him to questioning would carry great psychological weight to a reasonable person.²

² Douglas Starr, This Psychologist Explains Why People Confess to Crimes They Didn't Commit.

The factors here do not represent a textbook police-dominated atmosphere examples found in *Escalante* (defendant in custody when interrogated for 5 hours by federal officials at the border crossing), or *United States v. Craighead*, 539 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2008)(eight armed officers executed a search warrant on a home. The lead officer told Craighead he was free to leave, but then isolated him, and conducted a 20-30 minute private interview. The officer made no threats or promises. *Id.*

Ingenious experiments have shown how standard police questioning applies psychological pressure. June 13, 2019. www.Science.org/content/article/psychologist-explains-why-people-confess-crimes-they-didn-t-commit. (Site visited June 9, 2023).

Nevertheless, here nature of the restraint placed on Macias was both psychological and physical. A totality of the circumstances analysis demonstrates a situation in which a reasonable person would believe the officer was in control of the encounter. Freedom of movement is the determining factor in deciding whether an interview is custodial. *Beheler*, 463 U.S. at 1125.

Mr. Macias was in custody: a reasonable person would not believe he was free to leave or not answer questions.

Mr. Macias Was Subject To A Two-Step Interrogation

A deliberate two-step interrogation occurs when law enforcement deliberately ask questions of a suspect without *Miranda* warnings, obtains

inculpatory information, then offers the advisement, and then has the suspect repeat or elaborate on his earlier statement. *U.S. v. Barnes*, 713 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2013).

The question-first, warn later, is to obtain incriminating statements without applying constitutional safeguards against self-incrimination. Warnings given after a suspect has made an unwarned confession are ineffective, and a confession even after repeated warnings is inadmissible *Seibert*, 542 U.S. 600.

In the two-step interrogation, the question is whether:

It would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances the warnings could function ‘effectively’ as *Miranda* requires. Could the

warnings effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice about giving an admissible statement at that juncture? Could they reasonably convey that he could choose to stop talking even if he had talked earlier? For unless the warnings could place a suspect who has just been interrogated in a position to make such an informed choice, there is no practical justification for accepting the formal warnings as compliance with *Miranda*, or for treating the second stage of interrogation as distinct from the first, unwarned, and inadmissible segment.

Seibert, 542 U.S. 611-612.

The analysis for use of a two-step interrogation procedure requires the Court to determine whether the unwarned interrogation was deliberate. *State v. Rhoden*, 19 Wn.App. 193, 200, 356 P.3d 242 (2015).

The Court inquires on deliberateness by asking whether “objective evidence and any available subjective evidence, such as an officer’s testimony, support an inference that the two-step testimony support an inference that the two-step interrogation procedure was used to undermine *Miranda* rights. *Id.* at 201.

Objective evidence encompasses the ‘timing, setting and completeness of the prewarning interrogation, the continuity of police personnel and the overlapping content of the pre-and post-warning statements.’ *Id.* (citing to *United States v. Williams*, 435 F.3d 1148, 1158-1159 (9th Cir. 2006).

If, as here, the procedure was deliberate, the Court evaluates whether the ‘midstream’ warning

adequately and effectively explained to the suspect that he had a genuine choice on whether to continue talking after his first admission. *Seibert*, 541 U.S. at 616 (Souter, J. plurality opinion). There should be a curative measure informing the suspect that his earlier unwarned incriminating statements could not be used against him in a criminal prosecution. *Rhoden*, 189 Wn.App. at 201.

In *Rhoden*, officers searched a search warrant and handcuffed the home occupants. Officers did not provide *Miranda* advisements. *Id.* at 196. Occupants were questioned and affirmed there were drugs or guns in the home. Not until the officer took the defendant to find the drugs in the home were *Miranda* warnings provided. Officers questioned

the suspect a second time, asking “pretty much” the same questions he had asked pre-*Miranda* advisement. *Id.* at 196.

The reviewing Court held the timing, setting and completeness of the prewarning interrogation, and the continuity of police personnel and overlapping content of the pre-and post-warning statements, all supported the conclusion the two-step interrogation procedure was deliberate. *Id.* at 202.

The Court further concluded there was not a significant break in time or place between the pre- and post-*Miranda* interrogation. The Court found it significant the officer did not take measures to ensure Rhoden that his pre-*Miranda* statements

could not be used against him. *Id.* The Court held the post-Miranda statements should have been suppressed. *Id.*

Here, the deputy testified he wanted to interview Macias “and see what his side of the story was, but at that point, I formulated probable cause.” RP 89. He testified he met with Macias, obtained incriminating statements, then provided his Miranda warnings, arrested him, and took him to the Klickitat County Jail. RP 9,89.

Questioning Macias at his workplace to obtain incriminating statements and providing Miranda warnings afterward was deliberate.

Nor was there a significant break in time or place between the first and second questioning.

After Macias made his initial incriminating statements, the deputy provided the warnings and, without a break, questioned him on the same things a second time.

The third period of questioning was once again done after warnings were given, and the only change was the place: Macias was at the jail, not his workplace.

An individual may knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional right to remain silent: the issue is whether he in fact does so. Here, the mid-stream warnings, without a significant break in time or place and absent the curative measure of informing Macias the incriminating statements he had made earlier could not be used against him,

did not adequately apprise him of his Fifth Amendment right to silence sufficiently to enable him to knowingly decide whether to exercise that right. *State v. Hickman*, 157 Wn.App. at 776.

Because these statements were obtained in violation of Macias's constitutional rights, the trial court should have suppressed all the statements.

The Error was Not Harmless

A constitutional error is presumed to be prejudicial, and it is the State's burden to prove the error harmless. A harmless error analysis applies to erroneous admissions of statements which are obtained in violation of Miranda. *State v. Nysta*, 168 Wn.App. 30, 43, 275 P.3d 1162 (2012).

Here, there was testimony, a phone call, and an exhibit of text messages exchanged between the parties. However, absent the interrogation exhibit, there was no clear or precise admission of the alleged criminal conduct. The evidence was not so overwhelming as to necessarily lead to a finding of guilt of the charged crime.

For these reasons, appellant respectfully asks the Court to accept his petition for review.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing facts and authorities, Mr. Macias respectfully asks this Court to accept his petition for review as the issues involve a significant constitutional question of the right to not incriminate one's self.

This document has 2762 words, excluding the parts of the document exempted from the word count by RAP 18.17, and is submitted in 14 point font.

Submitted this 16th day of May 2024.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Marie Trombley". The signature is written in a cursive style and is enclosed within a thin black rectangular border.

Marie Trombley
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APPENDIX

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,)	
)	No. 39141-8-III
Respondent,)	
)	
v.)	
)	
MARC MACIAS,)	UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)	
Appellant.)	

STAAB, A.C.J. — Marc Macias appeals his conviction for second degree rape and challenges the admission of statements he made to law enforcement when they showed up at his place of employment, arguing the court erred in concluding he was not in custody at the time he was interrogated at his workplace. Building on his first issue, Macias contends the deputy engaged in an improper two-step interrogation by obtaining his confession before advising him of his *Miranda*¹ rights. Alternatively, Macias argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admissibility of the statements.

We conclude that Macias was not in custody at the time of questioning and in turn, the deputy did not engage in a two-step interrogation. Because Macias cannot show

¹ *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

deficient performance, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. Therefore, his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.

BACKGROUND

Marc Macias was arrested and charged with second degree rape. Prior to trial, the court held a CrR 3.5 hearing to determine if statements made by Macias were admissible. We summarize the court's findings from that hearing.

The Klickitat County Sheriff's Office received information that Marc Macias was the suspect of a rape allegation. Upon receiving this information, a deputy went to Macias's worksite to speak with him. "At the worksite location, [the deputy] contacted the project manager to see if he could speak with [Macias]." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 28. "The project manager [requested] another employee inform [Macias] that [a deputy] was there to speak with him." CP at 28. Eventually, Macias approached the deputy.

The deputy testified that during the initial interaction he was the only law enforcement officer on scene and Macias was not ordered or required to speak with him. Additionally, Macias was not handcuffed or placed in custody, and the deputy did not draw his weapon.

The conversation began with the deputy asking Macias general questions about the night in question. At first, Macias explained there was normal partying going on but "didn't go into detail about the incident that was claimed." Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 9. Once Macias began making incriminating statements, the deputy decided to read him his

Miranda warnings. After reading Macias his *Miranda* rights, Macias stated that he understood his rights, agreed to continue speaking with the deputy, and did not request an attorney.

After Macias made further incriminating statements, the deputy determined it was appropriate to place him under arrest and had Macias escorted off the property. “Once they were off the property, [the deputy] handcuffed and placed [Macias] in the back of the patrol car.” CP at 28. While this was occurring, the deputy read Macias his *Miranda* rights a second time. After they were read, Macias did not express confusion, ask for an attorney, or unequivocally state he did not wish to speak with the deputy.

The deputy transported Macias to the Klickitat County Jail. During the car ride there was small talk but the deputy did not “ask him anything else about the incident.” RP at 13. Once they arrived at the jail, the deputy read Macias his *Miranda* rights a third time. After reading Macias his rights he did not request an attorney, and Macias did not express confusion. At that point, the deputy continued to interrogate Macias regarding the specific allegations.

From these findings, the court concluded that up until the point he was arrested and placed in the back of the patrol car, Macias was not in custody to a degree associated with a formal arrest. After being arrested and while riding in the patrol car to the police station, Macias was not interrogated. At the police station, Macias was subjected to custodial interrogation after being read his *Miranda* rights. At that point, Macias made a

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights and agreed to answer questions and make statements. The court concluded that all of the statements made by Macias were admissible at trial.

Following a bench trial, the court found Macias guilty of second degree rape. Macias now appeals his conviction.

ANALYSIS

Macias challenges the trial court's conclusion that he was not in custody when the deputy first questioned him at his workplace. In reviewing the issue, we consider the trial court's unchallenged findings from the CrR 3.5 hearing as verities. *State v. Homan*, 181 Wn.2d 102, 106, 330 P.3d 182 (2014). Whether a person is in custody is a question of law reviewed de novo. *State v. Escalante*, 195 Wn.2d 526, 531, 461 P.3d 1183 (2020).

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a defendant against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. V. “*Miranda* warnings were developed to protect a defendant’s constitutional right not to make incriminating confessions or admissions to police while in the coercive environment of police custody.” *State v. Heritage*, 152 Wn.2d 210, 214, 95 P.3d 345 (2004). Without these warnings, a suspect’s statements made during custodial interrogation will be presumed involuntary. *Id.* at 214. Therefore, this court must first determine whether a defendant was in custody for the purposes of *Miranda*. *State v. Lorenz*, 152 Wn.2d 22, 36-37, 93 P.3d 133 (2004).

“Custodial” as it relates to an interrogation “refers to whether the defendant’s movement was restricted at the time of questioning.” *Id.* at 36. “An objective test is used to determine . . . whether a reasonable person in the individual’s position would believe he or she was in police custody to a degree associated with formal arrest.” *Id.* at 36-37. Under this standard, a detention does not necessarily amount to custody for purposes of *Miranda*. *Escalante*, 195 Wn.2d at 533. Instead, the court considers whether, under the circumstances, there was a serious danger of coercion. *Id.* “Relevant circumstances may include the nature of the surroundings, the extent of police control over the surroundings, the degree of physical restraint placed on the suspect, and the duration and character of the questioning.” *Id.* at 534.

In this case, the trial court’s conclusion that Macias was not in custody is supported by the court’s findings. Macias was at his place of employment, there is no indication that the conversation took place in an enclosed room or building, only one officer was present, Macias was not ordered to do anything and the officer did not exert any control over Macias’ movement. Finally, the questioning was brief before *Miranda* warnings were given. These are not circumstances that create a serious danger of coercion.

In support of his argument that the circumstances demonstrated a custodial interrogation, Macias cites to a Ninth Circuit case, *United States v. Craighead*, 539 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2008). This case is factually distinguishable. In *Craighead*, eight officers

executed a search warrant on a suspect's home and, although the defendant was informed he was free to leave, he was directed into a closed-door room in the home and interrogated for 20 to 30 minutes. *Id.* at 1078-79. The court found that the home was police-dominated and that the defendant reasonably could have believed he was not free to leave. *Id.* at 1079.

Next, Macias argues that the court erred by admitting any statements made following his first set of *Miranda* warnings because the officer deliberately engaged in a two-step interrogation tactic. The two-step interrogation process involves a law enforcement officer initially questioning a suspect during custodial interrogation without providing *Miranda* warnings until the suspect confesses. *See State v. Hickman*, 157 Wn. App. 767, 772, 238 P.3d 1240 (2010). Next, the officer "advised the suspect of [their] *Miranda* rights, acquired a waiver . . . and then resumed interrogation while referring to the suspect's earlier pre-*Miranda* admissions to elicit a post-*Miranda* confession." *See Id.* Courts will look to whether an officer deliberately used a two-step interrogation method to avoid giving proper *Miranda* warnings. *State v. Rhoden*, 189 Wn. App. 193, 200-01, 356 P.3d 242 (2015). Importantly, a two-step interrogation only occurs when both sets of the interrogation take place when a person is in custody. *United States v. Barnes*, 713 F.3d 1200, 1204-05 (9th Cir. 2013).

Macias's argument fails because the trial court concluded that Macias was not in custody when he was first read his *Miranda* warnings, and thus, there could be no two-

step interrogation procedure at that point. Although Macias may have been interrogated by the officer at his workplace, he was not subject to *custodial* interrogation, which would have required *Miranda* warnings. Therefore, because he was not in custody when the first interrogation took place, the deputy did not subject him to a two-step interrogation procedure.

Alternatively, Macias argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to object to the statements at trial that were the result of a two-step interrogation process. Based on our conclusion that Macias was not subject to a two-step interrogation, we determine that Macias fails to show deficient performance.

Both the Sixth Amendment and art. I, § 22 of the Washington State Constitution guarantee effective assistance of counsel. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed de novo. *State v. Hamilton*, 179 Wn. App. 870, 879, 320 P.3d 142 (2014). A successful claim requires the defendant to demonstrate two components: that counsel's performance was deficient, and that deficient performance caused prejudice. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687. Representation is deficient if after considering all circumstances, it falls "below an objective standard of reasonableness." *State v. Grier*, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011) (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 688). Further, prejudice exists if "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different." *Id.* at 34 (quoting *State v. Kylo*,

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166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177 (2009)). To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must overcome a “strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” *Kyllo*, 166 Wn.2d at 862.

Because the deputy did not employ an improper two-step interrogation process, Macias cannot show his attorney’s performance was deficient.

Affirmed.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.




Staab, A.C.J.

WE CONCUR:



Fearing, J.



Cooney, J.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Marie Trombley, do hereby certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington, that on May 16, 2024, I electronically served, a true and correct copy of the Petition for Review to the following: Klickitat County Prosecuting Attorney at paappeals@Klickitatcounty.org and to Marc Macias c/o marietrombley@comcast.net



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May 16, 2024 - 2:50 PM

Transmittal Information

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A copy of the uploaded files will be sent to:

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Comments:

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